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ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS AND THE INCOMPETENT
DEFENDANT: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE TREATMENT
AND PROSECUTION OF INCOMPETENT DEFENDANTS
Nationwide, state and federal courts order competency evaluations for
approximately 25,000 criminal defendants each year.' Courts, however, find
that only ten to twenty-five percent of the defendants are incompetent.
2
After finding that a defendant is incompetent, a court will commit the
defendant to the care of a mental hospital.3 If the defendant is suffering
from psychotic symptoms, the hospital will attempt to restore the defen-
dant's competence by medicating the defendant with antipsychotic drugs,
with or without the defendant's consent. 4 Antipsychotic drugs may relieve
the more severe symptoms of mental illness, but often cause side effects
that impair the defendant's mental abilities and that make the defendant
passive and detached from others.5 Once the defendant no longer is dis-
playing the acute symptoms of mental illness, hospital officials release the
defendant to the prosecution for trial.
6
Forcible medication raises two issues: first, whether a state may treat a
defendant with antipsychotic drugs without the defendant's consent, and
second, whether a state may try a medicated defendant. Forcible medication
of a criminal defendant implicates the constitutionally protected right to
privacy.7 Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention
a right to privacy, the United States Supreme Court has determined that
1. See Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits,
and a Proposal for Reform, 39 RuroaEas L. REv. 243, 245 (1987) (giving statistics regarding
number of competency evaluations ordered each year); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcIoNARY 32
(5th ed. 1982). STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY defines antipsychotics as a type of major
tranquilizer that is helpful in the treatment of psychosis and that has the potential to reduce
thought disorder. Id.
2. Winick, supra note 1, at 247.
3. See id. at 248 (discussing procedure court follows after court finds defendant
incompetent).
4. Id.
5. See PHevsicu's DESK REFERENCE 2071 (B. Huff 42d ed. 1989) (describing side effects
of antipsychotics); infra notes 19-42 (discussing side effects of antipsychotics).
6. See Winick, supra note 1, at 248-58 (discussing mental hospitals' treatment of
incompetent defendants).
7. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that right to privacy
draws on first amendment's protection of freedom of thought, fourth amendment's prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures, ninth amendment's penumbra of rights, and fourteenth
amendment's due process protection of liberty and autonomy); United States v. Charters, 829
F.2d 479, 493 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that forcible medication of defendant violates defendant's
right to privacy), rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1892-93 (10th Cir. 1984) (same); Rogers v.
Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1984) (same).
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individuals have a right to make personal decisions about their bodies.'
Moreover, the Court has found that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right.9 The Court, however, has determined that the right to privacy is not
absolute, but instead, that the state's interest in safeguarding the health,
welfare, and safety of state citizens circumscribes the right to privacy. 0
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that to override the right to
privacy, a state must show a compelling countervailing interest." Courts
have employed a balancing test when considering whether a state's interest
is sufficiently compelling to outweigh a defendant's constitutional right to
privacy.' 2 For example, in balancing the interests of a state and a criminal
defendant with regard to antipsychotic drug treatment, courts consider the
risks and the intrusiveness of antipsychotic drugs on the defendant's mental
and bodily integrity as opposed to the interest of the state in restoring the
defendant's competence with antipsychotic drugs. 3
Although antipsychotic drugs potentially are dangerous, psychiatrists
frequently prescribe antipsychotic drugs for patients who are experiencing
psychotic symptoms.' 4 Some of the common psychotic symptoms are ab-
8. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86 (determining that right to privacy includes right to
make personal decisions about one's body such as whether or not to use contraceptives);
Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 9 (lst Cir. 1984) (holding that right to privacy includes right to
make decisions regarding medical treatment).
9. See generally Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173 (1979) (discussing fundamental right of association); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (discussing fundamental right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(discussing fundamental right to privacy); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (discussing
fundamental right to association); R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAx, & J. YoUNo, TR.ATSE ON
CONsTrnoNAL LAw: SUBsTANCE & PROCEDURE, 222-23 (1986) (defining what constitutes
fundamental right). Fundamental rights are defined as rights that the United States Constitution
expressly states in the Constitution's text or which the Constitution implies because the values
are fundamental to freedom in American society. Id. The most significant fundamental rights
that the Constitution implies are the freedom of association, the right to interstate travel, the
right to privacy, and the right to vote. Id.
10. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1985) (determining that only compelling
state interest can override right to privacy); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
686 (1977) (same); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (same).
11. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 756-67 (stating that only compelling government interest
can outweigh person's fundamental right); Carey, 431 U.S. at 686 (same); Roe, 410 U.S. at
154 (same).
12. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (indicating that court
employs balancing test in cases involving privacy right); Roe w. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(same); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (same); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir.
1984) (same); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (same).
13. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1892-95 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that court
considers risks and benefits of procedure in deciding whether to allow state to perform medical
procedure without defendant's consent); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-63 (1985) (same).
14. See J. DAvis & J. COLE, Antipsychotic Drugs in AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PsYcmATRy
441, 442-43 (2d ed. 1975) (stating that physicians widely prescribe antipsychotic drugs); Brief
for the American Psychological Association at 5, United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th
Cir. 1988) (No. 86-5568) (hereinafter Brief for American Psychological Association) (stating
that physicians frequently prescribe antipsychotic drugs).
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normal perceptions, disordered thinking, hallucinations, and delusions. 5
The outward manifestations of psychotic symptoms include bizarre behavior,
distorted speech, extreme anxiety or panic, and inappropriate responses to
people.' 6 The primary benefit of antipsychotic drug treatment is a potential
reduction of a patient's acute symptoms. 7 Studies, however, indicate that
the patient still will exhibit some symptoms of mental illness.,'
Although antipsychotic drugs can be an effective form of treatment,
considerable evidence suggests that treatment with antipsychotic drugs may
not be therapeutic for every patient.' 9 The majority of health practitioners
maintain that predicting whether antipsychotic drugs will be effective for
any given patient is impossible. 20 Additionally, health practitioners agree
that antipsychotic drugs do not cure mental illness, but instead provide only
temporary relief.21 The most serious concern that critics of antipsychotic
drug treatment cite is that antipsychotic drugs may cause many harmful
side effects to a significant number of patients. 2 For example, antipsychotic
drugs can impair mental functions and cause abnormal motor activity.2
One side effect that impairs motor activity is called akinesia. 24 Akinesia
15. See K. BEm simn & R. LEwn;E, Scmzopm=NiA 127 (1979) (discussing common
psychotic symptoms associated with mental illness); E. McNErm, THE PSYCHOSIS 27-34 (1970)
(same).
16. See K. Bmnim & R. LEwnm, supra note 15, at 127 (discussing outward manifes-
tation of psychotic symptoms associated with mental illness).
17. See J. DAvis & J. CoLE, supra note 14, at 442 (discussing effectiveness of antipsychotic
drug treatment). Several recent studies indicate that treatment with antipsychotic drugs is
responsible for the reduction in hospitalized schizophrenic patients. Id.
18. See id. (indicating that even after antipsychotic drug treatment, patient probably will
exhibit symptoms of mental illness).
19. See A Review of California's Programs for the Mentally Disabled: Public Hearing
on H.R. 106 Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Mental Health and Developmental
Disability, 12-14 (Nov. 3, 1977) (hereinafter California's Programs) (statement of Dr. Theodore
Van Putten) (indicating that antipsychotics may not be effective for all patients); Fentiman,
Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically
Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MimZu L. REv. 1109, 1128-29 (1986) (same).
20. See California's Programs, supra note 19, at 12 (stating that it is impossible to
predict whether or not antipsychotics will work); Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1128-29 (same).
21. See California's Programs, supra note 19, at 12 (stating that antipsychotics provide
only temporary relief from symptoms of mental illness); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic
Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U.L. Ray. 461 (1977) (same);
Comment, Madness and Medicine: The Forcible Administration of Psychotropic Drugs, 1980
Wis. L. REV. 497, 539-42 (hereinafter Madness and Medicine) (same).
22. See generally PHYsICIAN's DESK REFERENCE 2071 (B. Huff 42d ed. 1989) (stating that
antipsychotic drugs may cause dangerous effects); California's Programs, supra note 19 (same);
Fentiman, supra note 19 (same); Madness and Medicine, supra note 21 (same).
23. See Brief For American Psychological Association, supra note 14, at 6 (discussing
side effects of antipsychotic drugs). In a brief for United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302
(4th Cir. 1988), the American Psychological Association noted that physicians characterize
antipsychotic drug treatment as a high risk treatment because the side effects associated with
antipsychotic drugs occur in a significant number of patients. Id.
24. See J. DAvis & J. CoLE, supra note 14, at 449-50, 460-63 (discussing akinesia, one
side effect of antipsychotic drugs that impairs patient's motor abilities); PHYsicL 's DESK
1990]
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causes lethargy, drooling, lessening of spontaneity, apathy, and a disincli-
nation to initiate activity.Y Patients suffering from akinesia often have rigid
facial expressions. 26 Another side effect that impairs motor activity is called
akathisia.27 Akathisia causes a pronounced inner restlessness or jumpiness. 
2
Patients experiencing akathisia often will not be able to sit still and may
be overcome by panic. 29 Furthermore, some patients suffering from akathisia
will experience an increase in psychotic symptoms.3 0
A third and more serious side effect that patients taking antipsychotic
drugs frequently experience is tardive dyskinesia (TD).3 1 TD is characterized
by rhythmic and involuntary muscular movements that often occur around
the mouth.12 The muscular contractions also may affect the limbs and the
trunk and may be so severe that the movements permanently cripple the
patient.3 TD also may cause involuntary movement of the fingers, hands,
legs, and pelvic areas, hindering the patient's ability to maintain balance.
4
In the more advanced stages, TD can interfere with all of a patient's motor
REFERENCE 2071 (B. Huff 42d ed. 1989) (same); Madness and Medicine, supra note 21, at
530-31 (same).
25. See California's Programs, supra note 19, at 12 (discussing akinesia, one side effect
of antipsychotic drugs that causes patient to feel apathetic).
26. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1129 (discussing akinesia, one side effect of
antipsychotic drugs that causes patient to feel lethargic); Madness and Medicine, supra note
21, at 531 (same).
27. See California's Programs, supra note 19, at 12 (describing akathisia, one side effect
of antipsychotic drugs that causes patient to feel agitated); Brief for American Psychological
Association, supra note 14, at 460-61 (same).
28. See California's Programs, supra note 19, at 14 (stating that akathisia, one side
effect of antipsychotic drugs that causes patient to feel restless); J. DAVIs & J. CoLE, supra
note 14, at 460 (same); Note, Antipsychotic Drugs and Fitness to Stand Trial: The Right of
the Unfit Accused to Refuse Treatment, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 773, 785-86 (1985) (hereinafter
Antipsychotic Drugs) (same). Akathisia is a frequent side effect of antipsychotics that causes
the patient to become extremely agitated and hinders the patient's ability to concentrate. Id.
29. See California's Programs, supra note 19, at 14 (stating that akathisia, one side
effect of antipsychotic drugs may cause patient to be overcome with panic).
30. See id. (noting that akathisia, one side effect of antipsychotic drugs may cause
symptoms of mental illness to worsen).
31. See J. DAVIS & J. Cora, supra note 14, at 462-63 (discussing tardive dyskinesia, one
side effect resulting from antipsychotic drug use); PHysicNr 's DES K REFERENCE 2071 (B. Huff.
42d ed. 1989) (same).
32. See Brief for American Psychological Association, supra note 14 at 462 (describing
characteristics of tardive dyskinesia, one side effect associated with antipsychotic drugs use);
J. DAVIs & J. CoLE, supra note 14, at 462 (same); PHYsIcIAN's DasK REFERENCE 1071 (B.
Huff. 42d ed. 1989) (same).
33. See Brief for American Psychological Association, supra note 14 at 11 (stating that
tardive dyskinesia, one side effect of antipsychotic drugs, can cripple patient); Note, Judicial
Schizophrenia: An Involuntarily Confined Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drugs, 51 U.M.K.C. L. REv. at 74, 79 (1982) (hereinafter Judicial Schizophrenia) (same);
Madness and Medicine, supra note 21, at 532 (same).
34. See Madness and Medicine, supra note 21, at 532 (stating that tardive dyskinesia,
one side effect of antipsychotic drugs, may cause patient to lose sense of balance). Tardive




activity, thus affecting the patient's speaking ability, swallowing and breath-
ing.35 Studies have estimated that approximately one-half of all chronically
ill schizophrenics suffer from TD.3 6 Furthermore, TD can afflict patients
who have been taking antipsychotics for only a short period of time.17 There
is no known cure for TD.
3 8
Another serious side effect associated with antipsychotic drug treatment
is impaired mental functioning.3 9 Studies have noted that antipsychotic drugs
can decrease a patient's abilities to learn, to remember, and to reason.4
Other effects of antipsychotic drugs include sedation, dry mouth and throat,
stuffy nose, blurred vision, urinary retention, constipation, and light-head-
edness. 41 Furthermore, health practitioners believe that antipsychotic drug
treatment is responsible for several deaths.4 2
Numerous courts have recognized that the severe side effects associated
with antipsychotic drugs heighten an individual's privacy interest. 43 Many
35. See Brief for American Psychological Association, supra note 14 at 11 (discussing
more severe aspects of tardive dyskinesia, one side effect associated with antipsychotic drugs).
In an amicus curiae brief for United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), the
American Psychological Association noted that clinical studies have reported that tardive
dyskinesia may impair a patient's abilities to drink, eat, read, and drive. Id.
36. See Madness and Medicine, supra note 21, at 533 (noting that studies show that
tardive dyskinesia affects one-half of all chronically ill schizophrenics); Brief for American
Psychological Association, supra note 14, at 12-15 (estimating that tardive dyskinesia affects
from 2007-60% of all patients treated with antipsychotic drugs).
37. See Madness and Medicine, supra note 21, at 532 (stating that tardive dyskinesia,
one side effect of antipsychotic drugs, can affect patient shortly after treatment begins). But
see J. DAVIs & J. CoLE, supra note 14, at 462 (suggesting that tardive dyskinesia only affects
patients who are treated with antipsychotics for long period of time).
38. See Brief for American Psychological Association, supra note 14, at 15 (stating that
there is no known cure for tardive dyskinesia, one side effect of antipsychotic drugs); Judicial
Schizophrenia, supra note 33, at 79 (same); Note, Protecting the Inmate's Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs, 64 WAsH. L. Ray. 459, 463 (1989) (same).
39. See Brief for American Psychological Association, supra note 14 at 16-17 (stating
that side effects of antipsychotic drugs may impair patient's ability to relate with others). In
an amicus curiae brief for United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), the American
Psychological Association stated that antipsychotic drugs can impair the patient's mental
abilities and can make the patient passive and disinclined to interact with people. Id. at 17;
see also Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1132-33 (discussing effect of antipsychotic drugs on
patient's ability to communication with people); Antipsychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 782-
86 (same).
40. See Brief for American Psychological Association, supra note 14 at 16-17 (stating
that antipsychotics can impair patient's memory, reasoning ability, and ability to function on
normal basis); Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1132 (same); Madness and Medicine, supra note
21, at 512, 534 (same).
41. See J. DAvis & J. CoLE, supra note 14, at 459-60 (discussing side effects of
antipsychotic drugs); Gaughan & LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic
Drugs in an Institution, 4 LAw & PSYCHOLoGY REv. 43 at 51-52 (1978) (same).
42. See Madness and Medicine, supra note 21, at 536-39 (discussing fatal side effects
caused by antipsychotic drugs).
43. See generally Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that severe side
effects associated with antipsychotic drugs heighten individual's privacy interest); Rennie v.
10631990]
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courts considering the issue of forcible medication have concluded that
institutionalized patients have a constitutional right to refuse treatment with
antipsychotic drugs.44 For example, in Rogers v. Okin 4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered whether the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts could administer antipsychotic drugs to an insti-
tutionalized patient without the patient's consent. 46 In Rogers patients who
were institutionalized at a Commonwealth mental hospital brought suit in
federal district court seeking to enjoin hospital staff from forcibly medicating
the patients. 47 The patients argued that forcible medication violated the
patients' constitutional rights to liberty and privacy.4 The defendants,
hospital staff members, argued that patients who are committed at mental
institution have no right to refuse medication because committed patients
are incompetent to make treatment decisions. 49 The district court granted
the patients injunctive relief finding that, if the Commonwealth forcibly
medicated a patient, the Commonwealth would violate the patient's liberty
and privacy rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution.50 The defendants appealed the district court's decision
to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.5 1
On appeal, the First Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
forcible medication violated the patients' rights under the United States
Constitution.12 In so holding, the First Circuit reasoned that, because
Massachusetts law creates a substantive liberty interest that gives institu-
tionalized patients the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, the district court
unnecessarily considered the constitutional issue.55 The Rogers court observed
Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 493 (4th
Cir. 1979) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1317 (1990); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984) (same); People v. Medina,
705 F.2d 961 (Colo. 1985) (same); In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40
(1981) (same).
44. See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6 (Ist Cir. 1984) (holding that institutionalized
mental patient has constitutionally protected liberty right to refuse antipsychotic drugs); Rennie
v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 969-71
(Colo. 1985) (same); In re Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51-53 (1981)
(same).
45. 738. F.2d I (lst Cir. 1984).
46. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).





52. Id. at 3.
53. See id. at 6 (finding that Massachusetts law grants committed mental patients a
substantive right to refuse unwanted medication) (quoting MAss. GEM. LAws ANN. ch. 123
§ 25 (West 1982)). The Rogers court noted that the liberty interests of committed patients,
created by Massachusetts law are protected under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (holding that state law may create
substantive liberty interests that due process clause of fourteenth amendment guarantees from
state infringement); Greenholz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (same); Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (same).
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that Massachusetts law pertaining to institutionalized patients mandates that
hospital staff follow certain procedures prior to medicating a committed
patient.5 4 For instance, Massachusetts law requires hospital officials to allow
a patient to make treatment decisions unless a court determines that the
patient is incompetent to make treatment decisions.5 5 Additionally, Massa-
chusetts 'law mandates that, if a patient is incompetent to make medical
decisions, a court must make a substitute judgment for the patient.56 In
Rogers the First Circuit observed that Massachusetts law requires that a
court consider six factors in making a substitute judgment for the patient
including the patient's expressed preference regarding treatment; the patient's
religious beliefs; the impact of the treatment decision on the patient's family;
the probability of adverse side effects; and the prognosis with treatment;
and the prognosis without treatment.5 7 After discussing the substantive
liberty interests created by Massachusetts law, the Rogers court noted that
the fourteenth amendment due process clause protects state-created liberty
interests. 8 In concluding that the process required under Massachusetts law
exceeds the fourteenth amendment's requirements, the First Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to terminate the injunction governing
the forcibly medication of committed mental patients.5 9
Not only have courts recognized that involuntarily committed patients
have a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs, but in Bee v. Greaves° the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant
in pretrial custody also has the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs.6 ' In Bee
the Tenth Circuit considered whether the State of Utah constitutionally
54. See Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1984) (discussing procedures provided
by Massachusetts law that hospital must follow prior to medicating committed mental patient)
(quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 123 § 21-25 (West 1982)); Rogers v. Commissioner, 458
N.E.2d 308, 313016 (Mass. 1983) (holding that court must determine whether patient is
competent to make treatment decisions if hospital seeks to medicate patient without patient's
consent).
55. See Rogers, 738 F.2d at 6-7 (observing that Massachusetts law allows committed
patient to make treatment decisions unless court finds patient incompetent to make treatment
decisions) (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § 21-25 (West 1982)); In re Guardianship
of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 56-59 (Mass. 1981) (holding that court must determine that patient is
incompetent to make treatment decisions to allow state to medicate patient without patient's
consent).
56. See Rogers, 738 F.2d at 6-7 (observing that court's substitute judgment determination
should approximate as much as possible subjective wants and needs of patient) (quoting Rogers
v. Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 308, 318 (Mass. 1983)).
57. See Rogers, 738 F.2d at 6 (enumerating six factors to be considered by court in
making substitute judgment determination) (quoting In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d
40, 56-59 (Mass. 1981)).
58. See Rogers, 738 F.2d at 8-9 (finding that MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 § 21-25
(West 1982) provides greater protection of patient's state-created liberty interests than fourteenth
amendment due process clause requires).
59. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1984).
60. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
61. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984).
1990] 1065
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could medicate Bee with antipsychotic drugs without Bee's consent. 62 The
Bee court noted that the State detained Bee prior to trial and forcibly
medicated Bee with antipsychotic drugs after learning that Bee was incom-
petent to stand trial. 63 Bee brought suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against
State officials in federal district court claiming that the forcible administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs violated Bee's fourteenth amendment due process
rights and the right to privacy under the United States Constitution. 4 The
State argued that the State should be able to medicate Bee without Bee's
consent for three reasons: the State has a right and duty to treat a mentally
ill detainee; the State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the defendant's
competence to stand trial; and the State has a duty to prevent a violent
defendant from injuring himself or others. 65 The district court granted
summary judgment for the State on the grounds that pretrial detainees do
not have a constitutional right to refuse medication. Bee appealed the
district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit. 67
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit in Bee determined that forcible medication
implicates the right to privacy, the substantive liberty interests of the
fourteenth amendment, and the first amendment right to think and com-
municate. 68 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit observed that the many dangerous
side effects associated with antipsychotic drug use heighten a defendant's
interest in avoiding antipsychotic drug treatment. 69 The Bee court, therefore,
required that the State of Utah show a compelling interest to medicate Bee
without Bee's consent.
70
In considering the State's first reason for medicating Bee, the Tenth
Circuit observed that a state has a duty to provide adequate medical
assistance to a defendant in custody so that the conditions of detention do
62. Id. at 1391-96.
63. Id. at 1389-90.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1394.
66. Id. at 1389.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1391-94. In Bee the Tenth Circuit reviewed the United States Supreme Court
decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), to determine that forcible medication
with antipsychotic drugs implicates the fourteenth amendment liberty interest. In Youngberg
the Supreme Court determined that the fourteenth amendment liberty includes a right to
freedom from bodily restraint and that the right survives both civil and criminal incarceration.
Accordingly, the Bee court determined that the fourteenth amendment liberty interest also
includes the right to be free from the mental restraint imposed by antipsychotic drugs. Id.
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit determined that forcible treatment with antipsychotic drugs
implicates the first amendment right to think and communicate because studies have shown
that antipsychotic drugs interfere with a person's mental and verbal processes. Id.
69. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1392-93.
70. Id. at 1394-95. The Bee court reviewed the United States Supreme Court decision in
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), to determine that a state may overcome an
individual's fundamental liberty interest by showing a compelling interest. Id.
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not amount to unconstitutional punishment under the due process clause.7 1
The Bee court, however, determined that the state cannot use the duty to
provide necessary medical assistance to justify medicating an unconsenting
defendant unless the defendant is incompetent to make medical decisions.72
In Bee the court noted that, because a court had not adjudicated Bee
incompetent to make medical decisions, the State did not have a duty to
provide medical assistance to the defendant.7 3 The Bee court next considered
the State's desire to maintain Bee's competence for trial.74 Finding that the
decision to take antipsychotic drugs is a medical and personal decision, the
Bee court held that the court would not consider factors that did not relate
to the well-being of Bee, such as the State's interest in maintaining Bee's
competence for trial.7 5 The Bee court, therefore, determined that the State's
interest in maintaining Bee's competence to stand trial was not a compelling
reason to forcibly medicate Bee.76 In considering the State's third reason
for medicating Bee, the Tenth Circuit determined that a state's interest in
protecting a defendant from hurting himself or others is legitimate, but can
justify forcible medication only if the state has no less drastic means
available. 7 The Bee court thus concluded that the State's interest in medi-
cating Bee was not compelling unless an emergency existed at the time that
the State medicated Bee and no other less dangerous alternatives were
available to the State.78 Accordingly, the Bee court reversed and remanded
the case for the district court to determine whether an emergency existed
when the State medicated Bee.
7 9
Several United States Supreme Court cases that discuss the rights of
defendants in pretrial custody support the Bee court's decision.80 The
71. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1895 (10th Cir. 1984). In Bee the Tenth Circuit
observed that under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that a state not punish a defendant until after conviction. Id.
72. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395. In Bee the Tenth Circuit determined that without a compelling






77. Id. In Bee the Tenth Circuit noted that when a compelling state interest conflicts
with an individual's fundamental right, the state's chosen means should be carefully drafted
to limit the infringement of the individual's rights. Id.; see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (determining that means chosen by government to effect compelling state
interest should be narrowly tailored; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (same).
78. Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984).
79. Id. at 1396-97.
80. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (finding that defendants in custody have
diminished expectation of privacy); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1985) (determining
that defendants in custody have right to privacy regarding unwanted medical procedures);
Washington v. Harper, 58 U.S.L.W. 4249, 4252 (1990) (finding that convicted prisoners have
fourteenth amendment due process interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsy-
chotic drugs).
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Supreme Court.first considered the rights of a defendant in pretrial custody
in Bell v. Wolfish.8' In Bell the Supreme Court considered whether the
conditions of pretrial detention in New York implicated the eighth amend-
ment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.12 The Bell Court
observed that the State of New York held Bell and other defendants awaiting
trial in a corrections facility and subjected the defendants to the same
restrictions placed on convicted prisoners. 3 For example, the State searched
the defendants' rooms, the defendants' persons, and placed restrictions on
mail the defendants could receive. The defendants in Bell brought suit in
federal district court alleging that State restrictions placed on defendants in
pretrial custody violated the defendants' eighth amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment.85 In Bell the district court determined that
the court could uphold the State's restrictions under the eighth amendment
only if the State could show a compelling necessity for the restrictions.8 6
Consequently, the district court in Bell enjoined many of the State's res-
trictions, finding that no compelling necessity existed for the restrictions.8
The State appealed the district court decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 8  In Bell the Second Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling but, rejected the district court's reasoning, finding
that the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
does not apply to defendants in pretrial custody. 9 Accordingly, the Second
Circuit remanded the case for the district court to consider whether the
conditions of custody were constitutionally adequate and not whether the
conditions amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth
amendment. 90 The State appealed the Second Circuit's decision in Bell to
the United States Supreme Court.9 '
On appeal, the Supreme Court in Bell observed that under the fourteenth
amendment due process clause a state cannot punish a defendant until after
81. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
82. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
83. Id. at 527.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 523.
86. Id. In Bell the district court observed that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty
and, therefore, if a state holds a defendant in custody prior to trial, the restrictions placed
on a defendant must be related to the purpose of assuring the defendant's presence at trial.
Id. Moreover, the district court determined that any restrictions unrelated to the need to assure
a defendant's presence at trial will be upheld only if a state has a compelling reason for
employing the restrictions. Id.
87. Id. at 528.
88. Id. at 529. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Bell upheld
the district court's rulings, finding that the parameters for judicial intervention into a state's
restrictions on pretrial detainees are greater than in cases involving convicted prisoners Id.
89. Id. In Bell the Second Circuit determined that pretrial detainees retain all of the
rights held by unincarcerated individuals and, therefore, that it is not sufficient for restrictions





trial and conviction.92 The Supreme Court, therefore, determined that the
proper test for assessing the conditions of pretrial detention is whether the
conditions amount to an unconstitutional punishment of a defendant. 93 In
considering whether the conditions of the New York State prison amounted
to a punishment of Bell and the other detainees, the Bell Court observed
that a state has a legitimate interest in maintaining security at the institution
where the state is holding a defendant. 94 The Supreme Court, therefore,
concluded that as long as the restrictions a state places on a defendant
reasonably are related to maintaining security and are not imposed for
purposes of punishment, the restrictions do not amount to unconstitutional
punishment. 95 Moreover, the Bell Court noted that, although restrictions
may invade a defendant's privacy in the defendant's room and person, as
long as the restrictions reasonably are related to a state's interest in main-
taining security, a court should uphold the state's restrictions. 96 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court in Bell reversed the Second Circuit's decision and
remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the State's
restrictions reasonably were related to maintaining security at the institu-
tion.9
7
Although Bell primarily relates to the due process prohibition of pun-
ishment prior to conviction, an issue that does not arise often with regard
to forcible medication, 98 Bell also has implications for the right to privacy
of a defendant in custody.99 The Supreme Court in Bell determined that a
defendant in custody has a diminished privacy interest that does not prohibit
a state from searching a defendant's person and cell because the state has
92. Id. at 528-29. In Bell the Supreme Court determined that, under the fifth and
fourteenth amendment due process clauses, a state may not punish a defendant until after
trial and conviction. Id; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 238, 237 (1896)
(holding that a state may not subject a defendant to hard labor until after trial and conviction).
93. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 528-29 (1970).
94. Id. at 540. The Bell Court observed that a court ordinarily should defer to the
judgment of corrections officials in cases involving a challenge to cbnditions of imprisonment
because corrections officials have a lot of experience in handling prisons. Id.
95. Id.; see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) (holding that
if defendant does not show state intent to punish, court should consider whether restriction
at issue is related to non punitive, legitimate governmental objective).
96. Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-57. In Bell the Supreme court found that if a search is related
to a legitimate governmental interest, as long as the search is not unreasonable under the
fourth amendment, the Court will uphold the search. Id.; see also Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (holding that only unreasonable searches are prohibited under the
fourth amendment). The Bell Court also noted that to determine whether a search is reasonable
a court must balance a state's need for the search against an individual's interest in privacy.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
97. Id. at 563.
98. Id. at 528-29. A state's main reason for forcibly medicating a defendant is not to
punish a defendant but rather, to restore the defendant's competence to stand trial. See, e.g.,
Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1894 (10th Cir. 1984) (discussing state's reasons for medicating
defendant such as to restore competence and to protect defendant's health).
99. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 556-67 (1979) (finding that defendant retains
diminished right to privacy while in state custody).
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a legitimate interest in searching these areas for security purposes.1?° A state,
however, generally administers antipsychotic drugs to a defendant for se-
curity purposes only in an emergency, such as when the defendant poses a
threat to himself or others.' 0' If a state administers antipsychotic drugs to
a defendant for reasons other than security, Bell indicates that a defendant
may have a protected privacy right to refuse the medication. 02
The Supreme Court's decision in Winston v. Lee'03 illustrates the interest
that a state must show to overcome a defendant's privacy right with regard
to an intrusive medical procedure.0 4 In Winston the Commonwealth of
Virginia arrested the defendant in connection with an attempted robbery. 05
The alleged victim in Winston shot the defendant during the attempted
robbery. 106 Subsequently, the Commonwealth sought to remove the bullet
surgically from the defendant for evidentiary purposes, but the defendant
resisted.? 7 The Commonwealth petitioned the trial court for permission to
compel surgical removal of the bullet from the defendant. 08 The proposed
surgery in Winston involved minimal risk and, therefore, the trial court
granted the Commonwealth's motion to compel surgery.'09 The defendant
petitioned the federal district court for a preliminary injunction, alleging
that the proposed surgery violated the defendant's fourth amendment right
to be secure in his person."10 The district court initially refused to grant an
injunction, finding that because the proposed surgery involved minimal risk,
the surgery was not overly intrusive."' On reconsideration, however, after
finding that the proposed surgery involved more risk than originally was
determined, the district court granted the defendant an injunction."2 The
Commonwealth appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit."' Finding that the proposed
100. Id.
101. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1874, 1894 (10th Cir. 1984) (stating that state forcibly
can medicate defendant in emergency if no less drastic alternatives are available to state);
Washington v. Harper, 58 U.S.L.W. 4149, 4256 (1990) (holding that state forcibly can medicate
convicted prisoner, incarcerated in psychiatric unit of prison, with antipsychotic drugs without
a judicial hearing if state determines in administrative hearing that antipsychotic drug treatment
is necessary for security purposes or for prisoner's mental well-being).
102. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 556-67 (finding that state can impose restrictions on pretrial
detainee's that invade detainee's privacy if restrictions reasonably are related to security
purposes).
103. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
104. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1985) (determining that state must show
compelling interest to compel surgical removal of bullet).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 758.
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surgery was risky and overly intrusive, and that the Commonwealth lacked
a compelling reason for requesting the surgery, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision. 114 The Commonwealth appealed the Fourth
Circuit decision to the United States Supreme Court."5
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision."
6
The Supreme Court concluded that, because the proposed surgery in Winston
would be risky and potentially harmful to the defendant, the Court would
require the Commonwealth to show a compelling interest to overcome the
defendant's fourth amendment right to privacy." 7 The Winston Court
determined that the Commonwealth lacked a compelling reason for the
proposed surgery because the Commonwealth did not need the bullet to
successfully try the defendant."18 The Supreme Court in Winston, therefore,
held that the Commonwealth could not compel the surgery." 9
Although Winston involved an overly intrusive surgical procedure, Win-
ston also has implications for a defendant's right to refuse medication. 120
Winston suggests that whenever a state seeks to impose a dangerous medical
procedure on a defendant, the defendant's right to privacy is implicated.' 2'
As the dangerous side effects associated with antipsychotic drug treatment
indicate, forcible medication is invasive and involves significant risks to a
defendant's health and well-being, much like the proposed surgery in Win-
ston. 2 Winston, therefore, indicates that courts should require states to




116. Id. at 767.
117. Id. at 765-67. In Winston the Supreme Court applied the Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966), test to determine whether the proposed surgery was reasonable under the
fourth amendment. Id. The Schmerber test requires that a court consider the reasonableness
of a search on a case-by-case basis by balancing an individual's interest in privacy and security
against a state's interest in conducting the procedure. Id. In Winston the Supreme Court
determined that the proposed surgery was highly intrusive because surgical removal of the
bullet involved general anesthesia and deep incisions into the defendant's shoulder. Id.
118. See id. at 765-67 (holding that proposed surgical removal of bullet implicates
defendant's right to privacy).
119. See id. (finding that surgical removal of bullet was risky and overly intrusive); supra
notes 22-42 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of antipsychotics).
120. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1985) (finding that proposed surgical
procedure implicates defendant's right to privacy).
121. See id. (holding that state must show compelling reason to overcome defendant's
fourth amendment right to privacy); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1894-95 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that state must show compelling reason forcibly to medicate defendant).
122. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1394 (10th Cir. 1985) (discussing state's interest
in security and in health and welfare of defendant as justification for forcibly medicating
defendant); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 492-94 (4th Cir. 1979) (same), rev'd on
other grounds, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1317 (1990).
123. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) (discussing state's interest in trying
defendant); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-40 (1979) (discussing state's interest in holding
defendant prior to trial); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 674, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1978) (holding
that state's interest in trying defendant is compelling); infra note 205 (discussing State v. Law).
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When deciding if a defendant can refuse antipsychotic drug treatment,
courts weigh the defendant's interest in refusing the medication against the
state's interest in medicating the defendant.'2 Courts recognize that states
have a strong interest in bringing a defendant to trial because states are
responsible for the safety of the public. 25 If a defendant is incompetent,
however, the fourteenth amendment due process clause of the United States
Constitution bars state prosecution of the defendant. 26 Because antipsychotic
drugs potentially may restore a defendant's competence to stand trial, a
state has a strong interest in medicating a defendant to be able to try the
defendant. 27 In weighing the opposing interests with regard to forcible
medication, a court will consider the benefits and the risks associated with
antipsychotic drugs as well as the state's interest in being able to try the
defendant. 28 In Bee v. Greaves, however, the Tenth Circuit determined that
124. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (discussing fourteenth amendment
right to fair trial with regard to defendant's competence to stand trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375, 376-77 (1966) (same); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam)
(same); infra notes 140-61 and accompanying text (same).
125. See Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395 (noting that state's interest in trying defendant conflicts
with defendant's interest in refusing medication); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1381-82
(N.H. 1978) (finding that state has interest in medicating defendant to restore defendant's
competence). In State v. Hayes the New Hampshire Supreme Court considered whether a
defendant may waive the tight to be competent at trial. Id. at 1380. In Hayes the State of
New Hampshire indicted the defendant for murder. Id. The defendant voluntarily had taken
antipsychotic medication prior to allegedly committing the crime and while he was in pretrial
custody to alleviate the psychotic symptoms that the defendant was experiencing. Id. The
defendant moved that the trial court allow the defendant to stop taking the medication seven
days prior to trial so that the jury could see the defendant in an unmedicated state. Id. In
Hayes the trial court initially granted the defendant's motion, but upon reconsideration, the
trial court determined that the defendant would be incompetent to stand trial if the defendant
stopped taking the medication and, therefore, the trial court reversed the previous ruling. Id.
The defendant appealed the trial court ruling to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, alleging
that the defendant's right to a fair trial prohibited the trial court from requiring the defendant
to take medication during the trial. Id.
In deciding Hayes the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that if a defendant
was not taking medication at the time the defendant committed the alleged crime, the defendant
would not have a right to be tried in an unmedicated condition. Id. at 1381-82. Consequently,
a court could compel the defendant to take antipsychotic medication prior to and during the
trial. Id. The Hayes court thus found that a defendant who was not taking medication at the
time of the alleged crime has a right to appear in the same unmedicated condition before the
jury. Id. The court in Hayes, however, held that a competent defendant who is taking
antipsychotic medication may decide to stop taking the medication prior to trial. Id. at 1382.
The Hayes court reasoned that if a defendant voluntarily refuses to continue taking antipsy-
chotic drugs, the court will consider the defendant as having waived his right to be tried while
competent. Id. Accordingly, the Hayes court remanded the case for the lower court to try the
defendant. Id.
126. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395-96 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that court will
consider benefits and risks when deciding whether court should permit state to medicate
defendant).
127. See id. (holding that court may not consider state's interest in trying defendant when
deciding whether court should permit state to medicate defendant).
128. See id. (holding that state forcibly can medicate defendant only if emergency exists
and no less intrusive alternative is available).
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a court may not consider a state's interest in trying a defendant when
deciding whether to allow forcible medication. 129 Under Bee a state would
be able forcibly to medicate a defendant only if the defendant is incompetent
to make medical decisions or in an emergency if no other alternative
measures are available to a state. 30 Consequently, courts following Bee
permissibly can consider only the risks and benefits of antipsychotic drug
treatment when determining whether a state should be able to medicate an
unconsenting defendant.'
Even if a court does not follow Bee and considers a state's interest in
trying a defendant when deciding whether or not a state can medicate a
defendant, the court probably will determine that the state's interest is not
compelling given the alternatives to medicating the defendant that are
available to the state.3 2 If a state does not get the opportunity to try a
defendant, in most cases, the state will be able to commit the defendant
under civil commitment procedures.' The possibility of civil commitment
partially fulfills the state's interest in trying the defendant because civil
commitment of a defendant protects the public from harm. 34 If a state
129. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that court will
not consider state's interest in trying defendant in determining if state can forcibly medicate
defendant).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 1396 (holding that state may medicate defendant only if emergency exists
and state has no less drastic alternative measures available).
132. See infra note 205 (discussing State v. Law). Compare Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395 (finding
that state interest in restoring defendant's competence is not compelling) with State v. Law,
270 S.C. 664, 674, 244 S.E. 302, 307 (1978) (determining that state has strong interest in
restoring defendant's competence).
133. See 18 U.S.C. § 4247(i)(B) (West 1985) (giving United States Attorney General
authority to apply for civil commitment under relevant state law for defendant committed to
custody of Attorney General). In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Supreme Court
held that a state cannot hold a defendant indefinitely if no chance exists that the defendant
will regain competency. Id. at 730. The Court reasoned that if a state holds an incompetent
defendant indefinitely, but does not accord the defendant the usual procedures granted to
individuals who are civilly committed, the state denies the defendant due process and equal
protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 730. Accordingly, the Jackson
Court held that the state either must release the defendant or institute civil commitment
procedures against the defendant if it is unlikely that the defendant will regain competence in
the near future. Id. at 738.
As a result of the Supreme Court's holding in Jackson, many states have enacted provisions
similar to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(i)(B) (West 1985). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1370(a)(2) (West
1982) (stating that if no substantial likelihood exists that defendant will regain competence,
state can apply for civil commitment); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15a-1003 (1983) (giving court power
to hold hearing to determine if court should commit defendant to mental institution if defendant
is unlikely to regain competence in near future); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-6(c)-(e) (West 1982)
(stating that court has power to institute civil commitment procedures if no probability exists
that defendant will become competent within reasonable period of time); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-169.3 (Supp. 1986) (giving court power to institute civil commitment procedures if
defendant is likely to remain incompetent for foreseeable future).
134. See generally United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (state has strong interest
in trying criminals); State v. Jojola, 553 P.2d 1296 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (same); State v.
Law, 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978) (same).
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civilly commits a defendant, the court generally dismisses the charges against
the defendant without prejudice.'35 Consequently, once the hospital releases
the defendant, the state may reinstitute proceedings against the defendant. 36
It is unnecessary, therefore, for a state to forcibly medicate a defendant to
preserve the state's opportunity to try the defendant.'3 7 Accordingly, courts
weighing a state's interest in trying a defendant against a defendant's right
to privacy probably will determine that the state's interest is not sufficiently
compelling to override the defendant's rights.
138
If a defendant is under the influence of antipsychotic drugs, the con-
sideration becomes whether the state should be able to try the defendant.
39
This issue arises regardless of whether the defendant voluntarily or invol-
untarily has taken antipsychotic drugs. Two main issues arise if a state tries
a medicated defendant. The first issue is whether the defendant in fact is
competent. The second issue is whether a medicated defendant can receive
a fair trial.
The United States Supreme Court has determined that, if a state tries
an incompetent defendant, the state violates the defendant's right to fair
trial under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.'
4
0
135. See Winick, supra note 1, at 246-49 (discussing procedures court follows if court
finds defendant incompetent to stand trial).
136. See id. (stating that state can try defendant once hospital releases defendant).
137. See id. (stating that court often dismisses charges against defendant without prejudice
when state civilly commits defendant).
138. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984) (determining that state's
interest in trying defendant is not relevant to court's determination of whether state should be
able to medicate defendant); United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 492-94 (4th Cir. 1979)
(same), rev'd on other grounds, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1317
(1990).
139. Cf. In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975) (determining that state violates
defendant's right to fundamental fairness under the fourteenth amendment if state tries
defendant in medicated state); State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323, 326 (Wash. 1960) (en banc)
(holding that state violates defendant's right to fair trial if state tries defendant while defendant
is taking medication).
140. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution provides that ".... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law .. ." Id. See generally Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)
(determining that trying incompetent defendant violates defendant's right to fair trial); Pate
v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (finding that trying incompetent defendant violates defen-
dant's fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CO ENTARtEs *24
(discussing rationale for common law prohibition on trying an incompetent defendant). In
Pate the United States Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether the trial court denied
the defendant a fair trial by failing to conduct a hearing regarding the defendant's competence
to stand trial. Id. at 376-77. In Pate the defendant was convicted of murder. Id. The defendant
appealed the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court claiming that the trial court denied the
defendant a fair trial by failing to hold a competency hearing. Id. at 376. The Illinois Supreme
Court in Pate upheld the trial court decision finding that the evidence failed to raise a doubt
as to the defendant's competence to stand trial, and that the defendant, in failing to request
a competency hearing waived the right to a hearing. Id. at 376-77. The defendant in Pate
petitioned the federal district court for habeas corpus which the district court denied without
a hearing. Id. at 377. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however,
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In Drope v. Missouri4 1 the Supreme Court suggested that the fourteenth
amendment prohibition against trying an incompetent defendant rests on
the assumption that an incompetent defendant will be unable effectively to
present a defense. 4 2 If a state tries a defendant who is unable to present
an effective defense, the state will be violating the defendant's fourteenth
amendment right to a fair trial.14 A second concern with trying an incom-
petent defendant is that requiring an incompetent defendant to stand trial
undermines the deterrence rationale of criminal punishmentY" One of the
goals of punishment in the American system of justice is to deter the
offender from future criminal activities. 45 The defendant, therefore, must
understand why the state is punishing the defendant for punishment to be
effective. 46 A medicated defendant may not understand why the state is
prosecuting the defendant and the defendant may have difficulties in effec-
tively presenting a defense. 47 Accordingly, a defendant's competence is vital
to his ability to present a defense and to the effectiveness of the deterrence
function. 148
The United States Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States149 clarified
18 U.S.C. section 4244, the federal statutory standard for determining
whether a defendant is competent to stand trial.Y0 In Dusky a federal district
granted habeas corpus and reversed the trial court, finding that the trial court had failed to
conduct a competency hearing. Id. After the Seventh Circuit granted the defendant a new
trial, the State appealed the Seventh Circuit's decision to the United States Supreme Court.
Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court in Pate noted that trying an incompetent defendant violates
the defendant's fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial. Id. at 378. The Pate Court
determined that because the defendant had a history of insanity, the trial court should have
ordered a competency hearing. Id. at 379-84. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Pate noted that
an incompetent defendant effectively cannot waive the right to a competency hearing because
the waiver cannot be knowing or intelligent if a defendant is incompetent. Id. at 384.
Accordingly, finding that the trial court denied the defendant a fair trial in failing to hold a
competency hearing and that the defendant had not waived the right to a hearing, the Pate
Court affirmed the appeals court decision. Id. at 387.
141. 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
142. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); see also STANrDARDS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE § 7-4.1 (1982) (establishing rules and definitions regarding competence to stand trial).
143. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171.
144. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1117 (stating that trying incompetent defendant
undermines deterrent rationale).
145. See id. (stating that one goal of American system of justice is to deter offender from
future crime).
146. See id. (stating that offender must understand why state is punishing offender for
punishment to be effective).
147. See infra notes 162-76 and accompanying text (discussing effect of antipsychotic
drugs on defendant's ability to present defense).
148. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (noting that defendant must be
competent for defendant to present effective defense); Fentiman, supra note 18, at 1117
(observing that if state tries incompetent defendant, state frustrates deterrent rationale).
149. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
150. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)
(1987).
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court in Missouri convicted the defendant for kidnapping.' The defendant
appealed the conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit alleging that the district court erroneously had found the
defendant competent to stand trial. 15 2 The Eighth Circuit noted that the
district court determined that although the defendant was suffering from a
schizophrenic reaction, because the defendant was oriented as to time, place,
and person, he was competent to stand trial.153 Accordingly, the Eighth
Circuit in Dusky agreed with the district court's decision and affirmed the
defendant's conviction.1 54 Dusky appealed the Eighth Circuit's decision to
the United States Supreme Court.155
On appeal, the Supreme Court in Dusky found that the district court
erroneously determined that Dusky was competent to stand trial because
the district court considered only whether Dusky was oriented as to time,
place, and person. 5 6 The Supreme Court reasoned that the proper test for
competency under 18 U.S.C. section 4244 is first, whether a defendant is
able to consult with counsel with a reasonable amount of understanding, 57
and second, whether a defendant is able to comprehend the proceedings. 58
The Dusky Court also determined that a defendant must be able to appre-
ciate his situation and the possible consequences of conviction for a court
to conclude that the defendant is competent. 15 9 Accordingly, because the
district court failed to consider these factors, the Supreme Court overturned
Dusky's conviction. 160
Both state courts and legislatures generally have followed the standards
the Supreme Court established in Dusky when considering whether a defen-
dant is competent and, therefore, have focused on the defendant's ability
to understand the proceedings, to comprehend the possible consequences of
conviction, and to aid counsel in presenting a defense.' 6 1 Moreover, in cases
151. 271 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1959).
152. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1959).
153. Id. at 388.
154. Id. at 402.
155. 363 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
156. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
157. Id.
158. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (1987) (establishing federal statutory standard for
determining whether defendant is competent to stand trial).
159. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
160. Id.
161. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (1987) (stating that defendant is incompetent if defendant
is unable to understand nature and consequences of proceedings against defendant, or is unable
to assist in preparing defense); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 1982) (stating that defendant
is incompetent if as result of mental or developmental disorder defendant is unable to
understand nature of proceedings or is unable to assist in defense in rational manner); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-4 (West 1982) (stating that defendant is incompetent if defendant lacks
capacity to understand nature and object of the proceedings or is unable to assist in defense);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (1983) (stating that defendant is incompetent if defendant is
unable to understand nature and object of proceedings against defendant, to comprehend his
own position with regard to proceedings, or is unable to assist in defense in rational and
1076
ANTIPSYCHOTIC DR UGS
subsequent to Dusky the Supreme Court has suggested that statutes which
follow the Dusky standard adequately protect a defendant's fourteenth
amendment right to a fair trial. 162
When determining whether a medicated defendant is competent to stand
trial, a court should consider the extent to which a defendant is suffering
from side effects of antipsychotic drugs. 163 Although studies have found
that antipsychotic drugs are helpful in relieving psychotic symptoms,'4
studies also indicate that the numerous side effects which may impair the
defendant's ability to relate with people regularly are associated with antip-
sychotic drugs. 165 Specifically, antipsychotic drugs can impair a defendant's
ability to remember, reason, and function effectively. 66 The side effects
associated with antipsychotic drugs, therefore, can have a profound effect
on the defendant's ability to assist counsel in preparing a defense. 67 Ac-
reasonable manner); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(a) (Supp. 1986) (stating that defendant is
incompetent if defendant lacks substantial capacity to understand proceedings against defendant
or is unable to assist in defense); STANDARDs OF CRIMNAL JusTinc § 7-4.1 (1982) (stating that
defendant is incompetent if defendant lacks sufficient present ability to consult with his
attorney with reasonable degree of rational understanding, and/or defendant lacks rational
and factual understanding of proceedings against defendant); infra note 167 (discussing sixth
amendment right to counsel).
162. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975) (determining that statutes following
Dusky standard are adequate to protect defendant's right not to be tried while incompetent);
Dusky v. United States, 363 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam) (clarifying federal statutory standard
for determining whether defendant is competent to stand trial).
163. See In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975) (stating that prior to trial, court should
consider whether medication adversely is affecting defendant); State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323,
326 (Wash. 1960) (en bane) (same).
164. See supra note 14-18 and accompanying text (discussing therapeutic effects of
antipsychotics).
165. See supra notes 39-40 (discussing side effects of antipsychotics that cause mental
impairment).
166. See supra note 39-40 (discussing side effects of antipsychotics that impair mental
abilities).
167. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id.; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (holding that sixth amendment right to counsel applies to state criminal proceedings).
In Gideon the Supreme Court considered whether the fourteenth amendment right to a fair
trial requires that a State provide counsel for indigent defendants in all criminal trials. Id. at
335. In Gideon the Supreme Court determined that the right to counsel is fundamental and
essential to guarantee the right to a fair trial under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 342.
The Gideon Court reasoned that the right to be heard is of little use to a defendant who does
not understand the law and cannot afford to hire an attorney to assist the defendant in
presenting a defense. Id. at 345. The Supreme Court in Gideon therefore determined that a
state must provide an indigent defendant with counsel in all criminal proceedings to protect
the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. Accordingly, the Gideon Court reversed the defendant's
conviction. Id.
In cases subsequent to Gideon the Supreme Court has determined that under the sixth
amendment, a defendant has the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Effective assistance
of counsel requires that there be no restrictions on the functions of counsel in defending a
criminal prosecution. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 650 (1984) (finding that right
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cordingly, if a state tries a defendant who is suffering from the side effects
of antipsychotic drugs that impair mental ability, the state may be denying
the defendant the right to a fair trial in violation of the fourteenth
amendment.
6
In addition to causing side effects that impair a defendant's mental
abilities, antipsychotic drugs may cause akinesia, a side effect that makes a
defendant feel lethargic and indifferent.169 If a defendant is suffering from
akinesia, the defendant may comprehend the proceedings, but may be too
apathetic to care about the outcome of the proceedings. 170 Akinesia, there-
fore, significantly can impair a defendant's ability to assist defense counsel
in deciding what strategies to pursue at trial.1
7 '
In light of these considerations, if a state tries a defendant who is
taking antipsychotics, the state actually may be trying an incompetent
defendant. If the defendant cannot aid his attorney because his mental
abilities are impaired, or because the defendant is lethargic or sedated, then
the defendant cannot exercise fully his sixth amendment rights. 72 Conse-
quently, in determining whether a state should be allowed to try a medicated
defendant, courts should determine whether a medicated defendant is suf-
fering from any side effects. 7 3 Moreover, courts should consider the extent
to which adverse side effects may impair a defendant's ability to present
an effective defense. 74 If a court determines that a defendant's ability to
present a defense will be lessened because of the side effects that the
to effective assistance of counsel is right of defendant to have defendant's counsel put
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial test); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259,
268 (1984) (holding that courts should presume that counsel is ineffective if counsel has conflict
of interest); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88-89 (1970) (finding that defendant did
not have effective assistance of counsel when trial court refused defendant access to counsel
during overnight recess).
168. Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1133 (arguing that state violates defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel if state tries defendant who is suffering from side effects of
antipsychotics); supra note 167 (discussing sixth amendment right to counsel).
169. See California's Programs, supra note 19, at 12-13 (stating that side effects of
antipsychotic drug treatment can give the patient a zombie-like appearance); Antipsychotic
Drugs, supra note 28, at 787 (same).
170. See supra notes 162-76 and accompanying text (discussing inability of medicated
defendant to assist in defense); supra note 167 (discussing sixth amendment right to counsel).
171. See supra notes 162-76 and accompanying text (stating that side effects of antipsy-
chotic drugs may impair defendant's ability to assist in defense).
172. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 493 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1317 (1990) (questioning whether
defendant who is taking antipsychotics is competent to stand trial); Fentiman, supra note 19,
at 1132 (same); Antipsychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 783-83 (same).
173. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 376-77 (1966) (holding that court should hold
hearing to determine defendant's competence to stand trial if any facts or circumstances
indicate that defendant may be incompetent); Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1132 (stating that
court should determine whether medicated defendant is suffering adverse side effects); Antip-
sychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 782-83 (same).
174. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1132 (suggesting that court should determine impact
of adverse side effects on defendant's ability to present defense).
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defendant is experiencing, the court should not allow the state to try the
defendant until the side effects diminish. 7 If a court fails to consider
whether a medicated defendant is suffering from side effects, the court may
be denying the defendant a fair trial.
176
A second concern with trying a medicated defendant is that the defen-
dant's appearance may prejudice the jury. 177 The United States Supreme
Court has determined that a defendant's appearance may prejudice a jury
so greatly that the impartiality of the verdict is questionable. 78 A defendant
suffering from akinesia will seem apathetic, indifferent, and detached from
reality. 7 9 To a jury a medicated defendant may appear unemotional and
unconcerned about the proceedings at hand."10 The appearance of a defen-
dant suffering from akathisia also may prejudice the jury because akathisia
causes the defendant to act overly jumpy and anxious."' If a defendant is
behaving in an excessively nervous manner, the jury might believe that the
defendant has a guilty mind and, therefore, the jury may not be objective."s2
Consequently, if a defendant is required to appear before the jury while
suffering from side effects of antipsychotic drugs, the defendant may not
receive a fair trial."8
3
175. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 376-77 (noting that state cannot try incompetent defendant);
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (same).
176. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 376-77 (determining that if state tries incompetent defendant
state, violates defendant's right to fair trial); Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (same); Fentiman, supra
note 19, at 1117 (same).
177. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1985) (noting that fourteenth amendment
guarantees right to fair trial); Estelle v. Williams, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692 (1976) (stating that
right to fair trial is fundamental liberty secured by fourteenth amendment); Fentiman, supra
note 19, at 1125-35 (stating that defendant may not get fair trial if state is allowed to try
defendant in medicated condition); Antipsychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 787-89 (same). But
see Note, Mind Control, Synthetic Sanity, Artificial Competence, and Genuine Confusion:
Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HoFsTRA L. REv. 77, 90-98 (1983)
(arguing that fair trial concerns not implicated if court notifies jury that defendant is taking
antipsychotics).
178. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (noting that impartiality of
tribunal is essential to fair trial); Estelle v. Williams, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1697 (1976) (holding that
court cannot require defendant to wear prison garb during trial under fourteenth amendment
right to fair trial); Illinois v. Allen, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970) (noting that sight of defendant
bound and gagged in court is likely to prejudice jury).
179. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (stating that side effects of antipsychotic
drugs can make defendant appear apathetic).
180. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E. 437, 444 (Mass. 1983) (stating that side
effects of antipsychotics can make defendant appear unemotional); Fentiman, supra note 19,
at 1128-31 (same); Antipsychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 878-89 (same).
181. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (describing akathisia, one side effect
of antipsychotic drugs that causes patient to feel agitated).
182. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1130 (arguing that defendant's medicated appearance
may prejudice jury); Antipsychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 787-88 (same); infra notes 184-
207 and accompanying text (discussing side effects of antipsychotic drugs and defendant's right
to fair trial).
183. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1130 (arguing that if state tries medicated defendant,
state may violate defendant's right to fair trial); Antipsychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 787-
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In In re Pray'8 the Vermont Supreme Court considered whether the
defendant's medicated appearance prejudiced the jury. 85 In Pray the State
of Vermont charged the defendant with first degree murder and placed the
defendant in pretrial custody. 86 Jail officials medicated the defendant with
tranquilizers prior to and during the trial to prevent the defendant from
becoming violent. 87 In Pray the jury rejected the defendant's insanity
defense and found the defendant guilty of first degree murder.' The
defendant appealed the conviction to the Vermont Supreme Court claiming,
inter alia, that the lower court denied the defendant a fair trial because the
court did not allow the defendant to appear before the jury in an unme-
dicated state.8 9
On appeal the Vermont Supreme Court in Pray observed that a jury
inevitably will use its perceptions of the defendant's courtroom appearance
to judge the defendant's prior mental state in every criminal case, and
particularly in insanity cases.' 90 Moreover, the Pray court found that because
the defendant was suffering from the side effects of tranquilizers that made
the defendant appear emotioniess during the trial, the jury might have
thought that the defendant did not care about the outcome of the trial. 191
The Pray court held that the trial court's failure to allow the defendant to
appear at trial in an unmedicated condition violated the defendant's four-
teenth amendment right to a fair trial.'9 Accordingly, the Vermont Supreme
Court granted the defendant a new trial. 93
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Murphy'94 also considered
whether the defendant's medicated appearance prejudiced the jury. 195 In
Murphy the State of Washington arrested the defendant for first degree
murder. 96 Prior to the defendant's testimony, jail personnel gave the de-
fendant tranquilizers because the defendant complained of a severe cold. 197
The trial court withdrew the defendant's plea of insanity after the defendant
testified that the defendant knew right from wrong when he committed the
murder. 98 The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of first degree
88 (same); infra notes 184-207 and accompanying text (stating that state violates defendant's
right to fair trial if state tries defendant who is suffering from adverse side effects of
antipsychotics).
184. 336 A.2d 174 (Vt. 1975).
185. In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174 (Vt. 1975).
186. Id.




191. Id. at 176.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 355 P.2d 323 (Wash. 1960) (en banc).
195. State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323, 325 (Wash. 1960) (en banc).





murder and sentenced the defendant to death. 99 The defendant appealed
the conviction to the Washington Supreme Court.2°° The defendant in
Murphy alleged, inter alia, that the trial court erroneously had allowed the
jury to see the defendant in a medicated condition. 201
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the tran-
quilizers made the defendant appear lackadaisical and uncaring to the jury
and thus influenced the jury in the decision to convict the defendant. 202 The
Murphy court, therefore, determined that in trying a medicated defendant,
the State violated the defendant's right to present a defense under the
Washington State Constitution. 20 3 Accordingly, the Washington Supreme
Court found that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to see the
defendant in a medicated state and, therefore, granted the defendant a new
trial *204
Both Murphy and In re Pray indicate that if a state tries a medicated
defendant, the medicated defendant's appearance may prejudice the jury




202. Id. at 326. In Murphy the Washington Supreme Court noted that the defendant's
attorney testified that after the State medicated the defendant, the defendant appeared to be
extremely nervous and taut. Id. at 325. Moreover, the defendant's attorney testified that when
the defendant took the stand, the defendant hesitated over every word and acted very guilty.
Id.
203. Id. at 327. The Murphy court determined that the State violated the defendant's
rights under Art. I § 22 of the Washington Constitution by trying the defendant while the
defendant was taking tranquilizers. Id. The Washington Constitution provides that, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person," WASH.
CoNsT. Art. I § 22. In Murphy the Washington Supreme Court noted that in an earlier case,
State v. Williams, 50 P. 580 (Wash. 1897), the Washington Supreme Court determined that
Art. I § 22 of the Washington Constitution encompasses the right of a defendant to have the
unfettered use of his mental and physical faculties when appearing at trial. State v. Murphy,
355 P.2d at 323, 327 (Wash. 1960) (en banc).
204. State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323, 327 (Wash. 1960) (en banc).
205. See id. (determining that state denies defendant fair trial if state tries medicated
defendant); In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 177 (Vt. 1975) (same). But see State v. Hayes, 389
A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (N.H. 1978) (finding that defendant who is taking antipsychotic drugs
does not have absolute right to appear before jury in unnedicated state); State v. Jojola, 553
P.2d 1296, 1300 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976) (same); State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 675, 244 S.E.2d
302, 307 (1978) (same). In State v. Law the State of South Carolina arrested the defendant
for a murder committed during armed robbery. Id. at 303. In Law the defendant had a history
of schizophrenia and had been taking antipsychotic medication to reduce the psychotic
symptoms associated with schizophrenia. Id. at 307. Jail officials withheld the defendant's
medication until defendant's attorney requested that the defendant be given a psychiatric
examination and treatment. Id. After a psychiatrist determined that the defendant was suffering
from psychotic symptoms, the defendant resumed taking medication. Id. Subsequently, the
trial court held a hearing to determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial
while medicated. Id. After the trial court found the defendant competent to stand trial, the
State tried and convicted the defendant for murder. Id. The defendant in Law appealed the
conviction to the South Carolina Supreme Court, alleging first, that the State violated the
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quently, courts should not allow states to try a defendant who is suffering
from adverse side effects of antipsychotic drugs. 206 If a court permits a state
to try a defendant who is taking antipsychotic drugs, the court should take
cautionary steps to insure that the state does not circumscribe the defendant's
right to a fair trial.2 To alleviate the problems presented in In re Pray
and in Murphy, several courts have suggested that the court could inform
the jury that the defendant is taking medication and explain the effects of
the medication. 2°8 However, no matter how a court instructs a jury, the
verbal information will not have the same effect as a defendant's actual
undrugged appearance. 209 Consequently, instructing the jury may be inade-
quate to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. 210
A second measure a court could employ to protect a defendant's right
to a fair trial is to hold a hearing whenever a defendant is taking antipsy-
chotic drugs. 21' The court, in determining whether a state should be able to
try a medicated defendant, should consider whether the defendant is suf-
defendant's right to privacy by medicating the defendant without the defendant's consent and
second, that the State had denied the defendant a fair trial by trying the defendant while the
defendant was in a medicated condition. Id.
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court observed that the defendant's counsel had
given the State permission to medicate the defendant. Id. at 307. Accordingly, the Law court
determined that the State did not violate the defendant's right to privacy. Id. Moreover, the
Law court noted in dicta that a defendant does not have an absolute right to refuse
antipsychotics. Id. Instead, a compelling state interest, such as the interest in restoring a
defendant's competence to stand trial, circumscribes a defendant's right to privacy. Id. After
determining that the State did not violate the defendant's right to privacy, the Law court held
that the State did not deny the defendant a fair trial. Id. The court reasoned that the trial
court adequately protected the defendant's right to a fair trial by holding a hearing to determine
if the defendant was competent to stand trial while taking the medication. Id. Moreover, the
Law court noted that the trial court safeguarded the defendant from prejudice regarding the
defendant's medicated appearance by informing the jury that the defendant was taking
antipsychotic drugs. Id. Accordingly, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Law upheld the
defendant's conviction.
206. See Murphy, 355 P.2d at 327 (holding that state should not try defendant suffering
from side effects of medication that alter defendant's appearance and behavior); Pray, 336
A.2d at 174-75 (same).
207. See Murphy, 355 P.2d at 327 (finding that court must protect defendant's right to
fair trial if defendant is taking medication by not allowing state to try defendant or by
informing jury that defendant is taking medication).
208. See State v. Law, 270 S.C. 664, 671-72, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (1978) (determining
that court may tell jury that defendant is taking medication rather than allowing defendant to
appear in unmedicated state).
209. See Antipsychotic Drugs, supra note 28, at 788-89 (stating that court informing jury
that defendant is taking medication is not as effective as court allowing defendant to appear
in unmedicated state).
210. See id. (arguing that instructing jury that defendant is medicated may not be effective
measure to protect defendant's right to fair trial).
211. See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (suggesting that court should hold




fering from any side effects that may prejudice the jury. 12 If the court
determines that a defendant is suffering from side effects which may
prejudice the jury, the court should prohibit the state from trying the
defendant until the side effects subside. 213 If a court fails to consider whether
a defendant's appearance may prejudice the jury, the court may be abridging
the defendant's right to a fair trial. 2 4 In light of the foregoing analysis, a
state should not be allowed to administer antipsychotics to a defendant
without the defendant's consent. 2 - Forcible medication significantly inter-
feres with a defendant's constitutional right to privacy by denying the
defendant the right to make decisions regarding the defendant's body.
216
The likelihood that a defendant will suffer from the severe side effects
associated with antipsychotic drugs strengthens the defendant's privacy
interest. 2 7 Moreover, a state's interest in trying a defendant is not compelling
because the state probably will not lose the opportunity to try the defendant
if the state temporarily drops the charges against the defendant. 21 If a
defendant is not going to regain competency in the near future, the state
may be able to commit the defendant pursuant to state law.21 9 This procedure
would prevent a state from forcing a defendant to take a potentially
dangerous drug simply to restore the defendant's competence for trial. 220
Furthermore, the state should be able to try a defendant who is taking
antipsychotic medication only if the defendant is not suffering from any
side effects that alter the defendant's cognition or demeanor. 221 If a state
212. See id. (discussing competency hearing that court should hold if defendant is taking
antipsychotics).
213. See Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437, 444 (Mass. 1983) (determining
that court should not allow state to try defendant if defendant is suffering from side effects
that alter defendant's appearance and behavior); In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174, 176 (Vt. 1975)
(same); State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323, 327 (Wash. 1960) (en banc) (same); supra notes 177-
207 and accompanying text (discussing prejudice and defendant's right to fair trial).
214. See Fentiman, supra note 19, at 1130 (arguing that defendant who is suffering from
side effects associated with antipsychotics may not get fair trial); Antipsychotic Drugs, supra
note 28, at 787-88 (same); supra notes 177-207 and accompanying text (discussing prejudice
and right to fair trial).
215. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (arguing that court should not allow
state forcibly to medicate defendant unless medication is in defendant's best interest).
216. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1391-94 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that forcible
medication violates defendant's right to privacy); supra notes 45-122 and accompanying text
(stating that if state forcibly medicates defendant, state violates defendant's right to privacy).
217. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text (describing dangerous side effects
associated with antipsychotic drug treatment).
218. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (stating that if court finds defendant
incompetent to stand trial, court often dismisses charges without prejudice).
219. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (stating that state may be able to
commit defendant to mental institution if it is unlikely that defendant will regain competency
in near future).
220. See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (describing alternatives available to
state if court finds defendant incompetent).
221. See supra notes 162-214 and accompanying text (stating that state should not be able
to try a medicated defendant if defendant is suffering from side effects which alter defendant's
cognition or demeanor).
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tries a defendant who is suffering from any side effects, the state significantly
will circumscribe the defendant's rights to a fair trial and to assist in a
defense. 222 If a defendant is taking antipsychotic drugs, the court should
hold a hearing to determine how the drugs are affecting the defendant to
properly safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights.
lIcHELLE K. BACHAND
222. See supra notes 162-214 and accompanying text (stating that if state tries medicated
defendant who is experiencing side effects of antipsychotic drugs that alter defendant's cognition
or demeanor, state violates defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel and right to fair
trial).
223. See supra notes 162-214 and accompanying text (suggesting that court should hold
hearing to determine if medicated defendant is suffering from side effects of antipsychotic
drugs that alter defendant's cognition or demeanor).
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